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DO SCORES ON THE GAMBLING FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT—
REVISED PREDICT DISCOUNTING OF DELAYED GAINS AND/OR
LOSSES IN A UNIVERSITY SAMPLE?
Jeffrey N. Weatherly
University of North Dakota
The present study investigated whether participants’ scores on the Gambling Functional
Assessment – Revised (GFA-R) would be predictive of their level of discounting of delayed hypothetical monetary gains and losses. One hundred twenty eight university
students completed the GFA-R and a discounting task involving two hypothetical monetary amounts that were framed either as gains or losses. Participants endorsed gambling for positive reinforcement significantly more than gambling for negative reinforcement. They discounted losses significantly more than gains and displayed a magnitude effect for losses (the effect was not statistically significant for gains). GFA-R
scores were significant predictors of discounting for only the outcome of losing $1,000.
Gambling for positive and negative reinforcement predicted more or less discounting,
respectively. The results suggest that the GFA-R may be a useful research tool, that
one cannot assume that discounting of gains will be informative about the discounting
of losses, and that the contingencies that may be maintaining a person’s gambling behavior may not be informative as to how that person discounts particular outcomes.
Keywords:
gambling functional assessment-revised, discounting, magnitude effect, multiple-choice method, university students
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Pathological gambling is a great societal
concern, with research suggesting that 1 – 2%
of the population suffers from the disorder
(see Petry, 2005, for a review). That being
the case, it should come as no surprise that
much research has been conducted on developing measures that can identify potential
pathological gamblers (e.g., the South Oaks
Gambling Screen (SOGS), Lesiuer & Blume,
1987; Stinchfield, 2002). Likewise, much
research has been directed at identifying the
potential processes that might underlie, cause,
and/or maintain the disorder (e.g., see Petry,
2005).
Although there have been numerous attempts to create measures to identify potential
pathology, attempts to create measures that
__________

potentially identify why a person gambles
have been far more sparse. The initial attempt
to do so was made by Dixon and Johnson
(2007), who proposed the Gambling Functional Assessment (GFA). The GFA is a 20item self-report questionnaire designed to potentially identify four different contingencies
(i.e., gambling for tangible outcomes like
money, for the sensory experience, for the
social aspects, or as an escape) that might be
maintaining the respondent’s behavior. Five
items are associated with each contingency
and the highest-endorsed contingency is theorized to be the primary maintaining contingency of the respondent’s gambling behavior.
Subsequent psychometric research on the
GFA (Miller, Meier, Muehlenkamp, &
Weatherly, 2009), however, suggested that
the instrument did not function exactly as it
was designed. Specifically, Miller et al.
(2009) demonstrated that although the GFA
was designed to measure four possible maintaining contingencies, exploratory and con-
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firmatory factor analyses indicated that it only
measured two (i.e., gambling for positive and
negative reinforcement). Additionally, not all
of the 20 items were associated with one of
these two factors, whereas some items were
associated with both.
These findings led Weatherly, Miller, and
Terrell (2011) to construct the GFA – Revised
(GFA-R). The GFA-R is a 16-item selfreport questionnaire, similar to the GFA
(Dixon & Johnson, 2007), that was designed
to identify gambling for positive and negative
reinforcement. Eight items are associated
with each contingency. Weatherly et al. reported that all 16 items cleanly and strongly
associate with one of these two contingencies.
Further, Weatherly, Miller, Montes, and Rost
(in press) reported that the GFA-R has better
temporal reliability and internal consistency
that the original GFA. However, whereas the
original GFA has been proven to be a valuable research tool (e.g., Miller, Dixon, Parker,
Kulland, & Weatherly, 2010; Weatherly,
Montes, & Christopher, 2010), little research
has yet been conducted with the GFA-R.
In terms of processes that underlie gambling
behavior, one that has received a good deal of
attention is what is known as discounting
(e.g., Petry & Madden, 2010). Discounting is
said to occur when the subjective value of a
consequence is altered because its delivery is
either delayed or uncertain (see Madden &
Bickel, 2010, for a review of discounting).
For example, if you were willing to accept $9
today rather than waiting one week to get $10,
then that decision would indicate that the delay of one week had decreased the subjective
value of the $10 by at least 10%. The general
finding is that, for delay discounting, the subjective value of a reinforcing outcome decreases as the delay to its delivery increases
(see Madden & Bickel, 2010).
Researchers have speculated that the process of discounting is involved in the disorder
of pathological gambling for both theoretical
and empirical reasons. Theoretically, one
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might expect individuals displaying impulsecontrol disorders (e.g., pathological gambling)
to possess a general preference for more immediate outcomes (e.g., see Yi, Mitchell, &
Bickel, 2010, for a discussion). Empirically,
numerous studies have found an association
between discounting and the problem/pathological gambling (see Petry & Madden, 2010, for a recent review). Although the
not always the case (e.g., Holt, Green, & Myerson, 2003), the majority of published studies have reported that pathological gamblers
discount delayed rewards at a greater rate than
non-pathological gamblers (see Petry & Madden, 2010). In other words, while a nongambler might be willing to accept $9 today
instead of waiting one week for $10, a pathological gambler might be willing to accept $7.
Research that has linked gambling behavior
and delay discounting has been conducted by
measuring discounting of delayed rewards.
Doing so has face validity given that gamblers
stand to gain something if they win. On the
other hand, gamblers also stand to lose something if they do not win. It is possible to
measure discounting of losses rather than, or
in addition to, discounting of gains (e.g., Holt,
Green, & Myerson, 2008). The absence of
research on gambling and discounting of losses is intriguing because one might speculate
that people might treat losses differently than
gains. Furthermore, research with both the
GFA (Dixon & Johnson, 2007) and the GFAR (Weatherly et al., 2011, in press) has indicated that individuals gamble for different
reasons. It would seem reasonable to suspect
that such individuals might also treat gains
and losses differently.
Existing evidence suggests that differences
are found between the discounting of gains
and losses. For instance, one reliable finding
in the literature on delay discounting of gains
is what is known as the magnitude effect
(Thaler, 1981); the level of discounting varies
inversely with the magnitude of the outcome
being discounted. For example, although you
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might be willing to accept $9 today rather
than waiting one week for $10, it is unlikely
you would be willing to accept $9,000 today
rather than waiting one week for $10,000, indicating that your level of discounting has decreased because the amount of the outcome
has increased. Estle, Green, Myerson, and
Holt (2006) reported finding reliable magnitude effects when participants discounted
gains. However, a magnitude effect for discounting losses was not reliably observed.
These two scenarios may also produce different absolute rates of discounting. Shelley
(1994), for instance, reported finding greater
levels of delay discounting for delayed losses
than for delayed gains.
Although researchers have not investigated
the connection between gambling and discounting of both gains and losses, they have
investigated how other subject variables
might differentially affect discounting of
gains and losses. Ohmura, Takahashi, and
Kitamura (2005) showed that nicotine selfadministration (i.e., smoking) was associated
with how individuals discounted delayed
gains, but not with how they discounted delayed losses. Ostaszewski and Karzel (2007)
found that lower-income participants discounted both delayed gains and losses at a
greater rate than higher-income participants.
Thus, research has suggested that delay discounting of gains and losses may not vary the
same way as a function of the same manipulations and that certain variables may influence
both types of discounting similarly or one
type of outcome but not the other.
If pathological gamblers are more impulsive
than non-gamblers, then one might predict
that they would display different levels of discounting of both delayed gains and losses.
However, it should be noted that gambling as
an escape appears to be more strongly related
to pathological gambling than gambling for
positive reinforcement (Miller et al., 2010).
One could therefore speculate that the heightened levels of discounting of gains by patho-
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logical gamblers might occur because they are
avoiding the potential loss of the outcome.
By that rationale, however, one would then
speculate that people who gamble as an escape might display lesser levels of discounting of losses because it avoids having to sustain the full loss later. As noted above,
whether this outcome is observed is yet unknown.
The present study was a preliminary attempt
test the above ideas and was designed with
several goals in mind. The first goal was to
determine if the GFA-R could serve as a valuable research tool. Several such measures of
value would be the instrument’s ability to
produce reliable results and distinct subscale
scores. The second goal was to determine
whether different levels of discounting would
be observed for gains and losses and whether
the observed rates would be differentially associated with the contingencies that were likely maintaining the respondent’s gambling behavior.
Undergraduate students were recruited to
complete the GFA-R and then a delaydiscounting task that involved four different
outcomes.
Specifically, each participant
completed the discounting task for two hypothetical gains and two hypothetical losses.
The two outcomes varied in magnitude and
the same magnitudes of the outcomes were
used for both the gain and loss scenarios.
Although the participants were not necessarily
pathological gamblers, their participation was
deemed appropriate because the above goals
did not, at a theoretical level, depend on the
presence or absence of pathology.
Given the previous research on the GFA-R,
the hypothesis in the present study was that
participants would score higher on gambling
for positive reinforcement than for negative
reinforcement. Given previous research on
delay discounting of gains and losses, the hypotheses were that participants would discount delayed losses to a greater degree than
they would gains and that a magnitude effect
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would be observed for discounting of gains
but not for discounting of losses. In terms of
GFA-R scores, it was hypothesized that participants’ scores on gambling as an escape
would be inversely related to discounting of
gains and directly related to discounting of
losses. The opposite predictions were made
for participants’ scores on gambling for positive reinforcement.

METHOD
Participants
The participants were 128 undergraduate
students (107 females; 21 males) who were
enrolled in a psychology course at the University of North Dakota. The sample was a convenience sample; pathological gamblers were
not directly targeted for participation. The
mean age of the participants was 19.7 years
(SD = 2.7 years) and their self-reported grade
point average was 3.4 out of 4.0 (SD = 0.5).
The vast majority of the participants reported
being Caucasian (94.5%), unmarried (96.9%),
and making less than $10,000 per year in income (93.0%). Participants received (extra)
course credit in their psychology course in
return for their participation.
Materials and Procedure
Participants completed the study using an
online research administration program
(SONA Systems, Ltd; Version 2.72; Tallinn,
Estonia). This program was accessible to
them through their psychology course. The
program tracked participation by individual
participants, which ensured that no individual
could participate in the study more than one
time regardless of how many psychology
courses in which the individual was enrolled
that semester. The present study was completed within one semester.
Before beginning the procedure, the participant was presented with informed-consent
information, which described the study as approved by the Institutional Review Board at
the University of North Dakota. Continued
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participation in the study beyond this information constituted the granting of informed
consent.
The first measure participants completed
was a demographic questionnaire. This instrument asked the participants to report their
sex, age, grade point average, race, marital
status, and annual income.
The second measure participants completed
was the GFA-R (Weatherly et al., 2011). The
GFA-R is a 16-item self-report questionnaire
intended to identify whether the respondent’s
gambling behavior is maintained by positive
and/or negative reinforcement. Eight items
are associated with each contingency and can
be endorsed on a scale of 0 (never) to 6 (always). A representative item designed to
measure gambling for positive reinforcement
is “After I gamble, I like to go out and celebrate my winnings with others.” A representative item designed to measure gambling
for negative reinforcement is: “I gamble after
fighting with my friends, spouse, or significant other.” Research has suggested that the
GFA-R has excellent construct validity
(Weatherly et al., 2011), excellent internal
consistency (Weatherly et al., in press), and
good to excellent test-retest reliability
(Weatherly et al., in press).
The third measure participants completed
was a delay-discounting task. This task involved two different hypothetical monetary
amounts ($1,000 or $100,000). Likewise,
these different amounts were framed either as
gains or as losses. The two different monetary amounts were used as an attempt to produce the magnitude effect (Thaler, 1981).
The exact wording of each outcome can be
found in the Appendix.
Participants completed five questions pertaining to each scenario. The questions differed in terms of the delay that was involved
until the participant hypothetically gained, or
had to pay, the full amount. The five different
delays were 6 months, 1 year, 3 years, 5
years, and 10 years. The procedure used to
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determine the indifference point at each delay
was the multiple-choice method (Beck & Triplett, 2009). Specifically, at each delay to the
full amount, the participants selected the immediately available amount that was preferred
relative to waiting. Participants selected from
51 possible outcomes, which varied in $20 or
$200 increments from $0 to the maximum
amount for the $1,000 and $100,000 outcomes, respectively. Although this method is
not the most widely used method for collecting delay-discounting data, research using the
multiple-choice method has demonstrated that
it produces interpretable data (e.g., Beck &
Triplett, 2009; Weatherly, Plumm, &
Derenne, 2011) that are typically comparable
to other methods (Weatherly & Derenne,
2011).
Participants completed all five questions
pertaining to a particular outcome prior to
completing the five questions pertaining to
the next outcome (i.e., outcomes were presented serially), with the presentation of the
five different delays to the outcome varying
randomly across participants and outcomes.
Likewise, the order that the four different outcomes were presented was varied randomly
across participants.
Analysis of the Discounting Data
Rates of delay discounting were determined
by calculating the area under the discounting
curve created using Equation 1 (Myerson,
Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001):
[x2 – x1] x [(y1 + y2)/2] (Equation 1)
With Equation 1, area under the curve (AUC)
is calculated by summing the areas of the successive trapezoids. The resulting AUC value
represents a proportion that can range between 0.0 and 1.0. Smaller AUC values are
indicative of greater levels of discounting and
larger AUC values are indicative of lesser or
no discounting.
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Equation 1 is not the only possible method
for analyzing delay-discounting data, nor is it
the most frequently used method (see Madden
& Bickel, 2010, for a discussion). It was used
in the present study for several reasons. First,
it is atheoretical about the form the discounting data should follow, rather than assuming
that discounting will take a certain form (e.g.,
a hyperbola; Mazur, 1987). Second, AUC
values directly represent the data, rather than
being estimated from the data.1 Lastly, AUC
values are typically parametric and therefore
do not require transformation prior to conducting parametric statistical analyses, which
is not the case with other methods.

RESULTS
Participants’ scores on the positive and negative reinforcement sections of the GFA-R
were compared by conducting a relatedsamples t test. Results indicated that participants scored significantly higher on gambling
for positive reinforcement (Mean = 11.72, SD
= 12.36) than they did for negative reinforcement (Mean = 1.84, SD = 5.40; Wilcoxon
signed ranks test, p < .001). Scores on the
positive reinforcement subscale ranged from 0
– 39, with 39.1% of the participants scoring 0.
Scores on the negative reinforcement subscale
ranged from 0 – 28, with 77.3% of the participants scoring 0. Results from this analysis,
and all the follow, were considered significant
at p < .05.
Figure 1 displays the mean AUC values that
were observed for each hypothetical monetary
amount when it was framed as a gain or a
loss. Several results are apparent in Figure 1.
First, participants discounted losses to a
greater extent than they did gains. Second, a
magnitude effect was observed for both gains
and losses, but the direction of the effect varied by how the amount was framed. Whereas
1

One could argue that AUC does assume that discounting between the different delays, five in this study, is
linear. That assumption may or may not be true.
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Figure 1. Presented are the mean AUC values for each hypothetical monetary amount
when it was framed as a gain or a loss. The error bars represent one standard error of the
mean across participants for that particular outcome.
participants displayed a small tendency to
discount $100,000 less (i.e., higher AUC values) than they did $1,000 when the amounts
were gains, they discounted $100,000 more
than they did $1,000 when the amounts were
losses.
The results from statistical analyses generally supported these observations. The data
used to construct Figure 1 were subjected to a
two-way (Type of Outcome X Monetary
Amount) repeated-measures analysis of variance. The main effect of type of outcome was
significant, F(1, 127) = 47.30, p < .001, η2 =
.271, indicating that participants discounted
losses to a greater extent than they did gains.
The main effect of monetary amount was significant, F(1, 127) = 7.45, p =.007, η2 = .055,
indicating that participants discounted
$100,000 to a greater extent than they did
$1,000. Lastly, the interaction between type
of outcome and monetary amount was also
significant, F(1, 127) = 22.15, p < .001, η2 =
.148, indicating that how the different

amounts were discounted varied as a function
of whether the amounts were to be gained or
lost.
Because of the significant interaction, tests
of simple effects were conducted. Results
showed that participants discounted losing
both $1,000, F(1, 127) = 13.46, p < .001, η2 =
.096, and $100,000, F(1, 127) = 74.27, p <
.001, η2 = .369, significantly more than they
did gaining those same amounts. The magnitude effect did not reach statistical significance when the participants discounted gains,
F(1, 127) = 1.54, p = .218, η2 = .012. However, the magnitude effect was significant
when participants discounted losses, F(1, 127)
= 22.16, p < .001, η2 = .149.
To determine whether GFA-R scores predicted discounting rates of the different outcomes, a series of simultaneous linear regressions were conducted with AUC values for
each outcome serving as the dependent
measures and GFA-R scores on the positive
and negative reinforcement subscales serving
63
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as the predictor variables.2 Simultaneous regressions were employed because such analyses allow for determining the independent
contribution of each predictor variable.
When discounting gaining $1,000 was analyzed, neither the regression model, F < 1, nor
the predictor variables were statistically significant. The same result was observed when
discounting gaining $100,000 was analyzed,
F < 1. Thus, neither gambling for positive
nor negative reinforcement predicted rates of
discounting gains.
When discounting losing $1,000 was analyzed, the regression model was significant,
F(2, 127) = 3.82, p = .025, R2 = .058. Likewise, both GFA-R scores for positive reinforcement, β = -0.20, p = .033, and negative
reinforcement, β = 0.22, p = .019, were significant predictors of discounting losing $1,000.
Higher positive reinforcement scores were
predictive of more discounting, whereas higher negative reinforcement scores were predictive of less discounting. When discounting
losing $100,000 was analyzed, the regression
model was not significant, F(2, 127) = 1.05, p
= .352, R2 = .017. Likewise, neither predictor
variable was significant, although it can be
noted that the direction of the relationship between the predictor variables and discounting
was similar to that observed for discounting
losing $1,000.

DISCUSSION
One hypothesis of the present study was
that participants would endorse gambling as a
function of positive reinforcement on the
2

One could argue that, because many participants
scored 0 on the GFA-R subscales of either positive
reinforcement or escape, the relationship between subscales scores and AUC values would not be linear. To
address this concern, GFA-R subscale scores were
coded as either 0 (subscale score = 0) or 1 (subscale
score > 0) and the regression analyses reported in the
Results section were repeated. The outcomes of these
analyses were identical to those reported in the Results
when the raw subscale scores were used as the predictor variables.
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GFA-R (Weatherly et al., 2011) significantly
more than they would as a function of negative reinforcement. The results supported that
hypothesis. A second hypothesis was that
participants would discount losses significantly more than they would gains. The results
also supported that hypothesis. Next, it was
hypothesized that a magnitude effect would
be observed for discounting of gains, but not
for discounting of losses. In terms of statistically significant results, exactly the opposite
result was observed. Lastly, it was predicted
that GFA-R scores for escape would be inversely related to discounting of gains and
directly related to discounting of losses,
whereas the opposite would be observed for
GFA-R scores for positive reinforcement.
These predictions were not supported when
participants discounted gains, but were at
least partially supported when participants
discounted losses.
Weatherly et al. (2011) also reported finding higher positive reinforcement scores on
the GFA-R than negative reinforcement
scores. The present results suggest that outcome may be reliable. It should not be assumed, however, that positive reinforcement
scores will always be higher than negative
reinforcement scores. In fact, 3 of the 128
participants in the present study scored higher
on negative than positive reinforcement on
the GFA-R. Perhaps more importantly, these
results should help inform practitioners how
scores on the GFA-R should be interpreted.
Specifically, one should not assume, if an individual scores the same on the positive and
negative reinforcement subscales, that the individual’s gambling is maintained equally by
positive and negative reinforcement. Rather,
given that most individuals score higher for
positive reinforcement than for negative reinforcement, such a result might represent a
disproportionate influence of gambling maintained by negative reinforcement.
In terms of discounting, finding that losses
were discounted significantly more than gains
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replicates previous research findings (Shelley,
1994). At a theoretical level, such a result
would seem intuitive if one assumes that rates
of discounting will vary as function of the
value of the outcome. That is, if losses are
valued to a lesser degree than gains, one
would expect to observe more discounting for
losses than for gains. On a more practical
level, however, the present results should
highlight an important aspect of researching
delay discounting. Specifically, one cannot
assume that measuring one type of discounting (e.g., discounting of gains) will produce
results that generalize to other types of discounting (e.g., discounting of losses).
A good example of that can be observed in
Figure 1. Whereas a small, albeit nonstatistically significant, magnitude effect
(Thaler, 1981) was observed for the discounting of gains, the same manipulation produced
the opposite, and significant, change in discounting of losses. This difference may make
intuitive sense in that, as potential gains increase in size, they become more valuable
and, as potential losses increase in size, they
become less valuable. With that said, previous researchers (e.g., Estle et al., 2006) have
reported finding reliable magnitude effects for
gains but not for losses. Thus, the present results would need to be replicated to determine
the reliability of the present findings. However, given the large observed effect sizes
(Cohen, 1988), one would predict that they
would be. It is also possible that the present
results were influenced by the amounts chosen for study. That is, had the differences in
magnitudes been larger, a statistically significant magnitude effect for discounting gains
may have been observed. Likewise, had the
magnitudes tested been smaller, the magnitude effect for the discounting of losses may
not have been observed.
Finding that GFA-R subscale scores were
only predictive of discounting for one of the
four outcomes does not suggest that there is a
strong relationship between the contingencies
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that maintain gambling behavior and the process(es) of discounting. Inasmuch as these
results suggest that there is such a disconnection, they question the supposition that the
process of discounting is a primary component of problem/pathological gambling.
With that said, gambling for positive and for
negative reinforcement were both predictive
of delay discounting of losing $1,000. Thus,
one cannot claim that such contingencies will
never be related to discounting. An intriguing
feature of these results was that scores on the
two GFA-R subscales were related to discounting in opposing directions. That is, as
GFA-R scores for positive reinforcement increased, the less of the hypothetical loss participants were willing to pay immediately rather than waiting. As scores on gambling for
negative reinforcement increased, the more of
the hypothetical loss participants were willing
to pay immediately rather than waiting to pay
the full amount. In other words, the higher
participants scored on gambling for negative
reinforcement, the more likely they were to
display a self-control response when discounting losing $1,000.
Assuming this result is reliable, it might
seem counter intuitive. That is, if problem/pathological gambling is closely related
to gambling as an escape (Miller et al., 2010),
and problem/pathological gamblers are more
likely to display an impulsive, rather than a
self-control, response (e.g., Petry & Madden,
2010), then the present results are the opposite of what one might predict. However, it
should again be noted that previous research
in this area has focused on discounting of
gains. It might be the case that people whose
gambling is maintained by negative reinforcement are more prone than those whose
gambling is maintained by positive reinforcement to have their behavior altered by
delayed aversive events. Losing $1,000 may
have been aversive enough to alter their behavior (and/or too small to alter the behavior
of those who gamble for positive reinforce-
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ment). A similar effect may not have been
observed for losing $100,000 because the size
of that loss was so substantial that it masked
this particular difference. Future research will
be needed to determine whether this result is
in fact reliable and whether this particular explanation is plausible. The fact that these
possibilities remain viable also supports the
idea that the GFA-R might be a valuable research tool.
It should be noted that there are a number of
issues related to the present study that promote caution if and when attempting to generalize the results. The present sample was
comprised of university undergraduates who,
on the basis of their self-reported annual income, appeared to be full-time students. These individuals were relatively young, the sample was primarily female, the vast majority of
participants were Caucasian, and nearly all
were unmarried. Any of these factors may
have influenced the results. It is also the case
that they were all attending an institution in
the upper Midwest of the United States. Replicating the present procedure with a more
diverse sample than used in this study would
seem warranted.
The present procedure (i.e., the multiplechoice method) was also not the typical procedure used in studies of delay discounting.
Research has demonstrated that rates of discounting can vary as a function of method
employed to collect the data (e.g., Smith &
Hantula, 2008). Thus, it cannot be assumed
that similar results would have been observed
had a different method been employed.
Lastly, the present study did not target
pathological gamblers. Thus, it is not possible
to tell whether the present results would be
replicated in that population. Given that the
GFA-R was intended to be used with people
with potential gambling problems, future research should certainly focus on using the
GFA-R, and measuring discounting, with this
particular population. Only then will we know
the usefulness of the GFA-R and its potential
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relationship to discounting in pathological
gamblers.
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APPENDIX
Questions asked in the delay-discounting task. X time was 6 months, 1 year, 3 years, 5 years, or
10 years, across questions. Participants selected an answer from 51 potential choices (see the
Method section).
Gain $1,000
You own a number of bonds. Your financial advisor tells you that if you wait X time, the bonds
will be worth $1,000. However, you can cash them in now, although you will not get the full
amount. What is the smallest amount of money you would accept today rather than waiting X
time to get $1,000?
Gain $100,000
You own a number of bonds. Your financial advisor tells you that if you wait X time, the bonds
will be worth $100,000. However, you can cash them in now, although you will not get the full
amount. What is the smallest amount of money you would accept today rather than waiting X
time to get $100,000?
Lose $1,000
You recently lost money on a bad investment, and in X time you will have to pay your broker
$1,000. Your broker, however, is willing to make a deal with you to allow you to pay part of
what you owe immediately instead of the full amount in X time. What is the most money you
would be willing to pay immediately rather than waiting to pay the full $1,000?
Lose $100,000
You recently lost money on a bad investment, and in X time you will have to pay your broker
$100,000. Your broker, however, is willing to make a deal with you to allow you to pay part of
what you owe immediately instead of the full amount in X time. What is the most money you
would be willing to pay immediately rather than waiting to pay the full $100,000?
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